If the script works, why change it? Despite being the last among the Western powers to join the imperialism race, the United States of America proved to be a quick and able student and learned from the masters of the art of hegemony and global dominance: the British, French and the Dutch.
America's intervention in Southeast Asian affairs began when it 'liberated' the Philippines from the clutches of the dastardly Spaniards, only to claim it for themselves. Since the 1950s, America has played the role of the puppet-master and king-maker in the Philippines and the rest of the Asean region.
Washington had its hand in the promotion of Ramon Magsaysay, Diosdano Macapagal, Ferdinand Marcos and a few other cronies in Manila. It also helped to prop up the generals in Thailand, Southern Vietnam and of course Indonesia during the reign of Soeharto. After the fall of Marcos and Soeharto, many in the region thought they had seen the end of US intervention in the region. The Americans were told to leave the Philippines and their battleships were sent-a-packing.
But Sept 11 has reversed the trend and now the bad 'ol days are back. Thanks to that 'great defender of Islam' Osama ben Laden and his al-Qaeda network, the US has managed to stage a spectacular recovery riding the waves of popular paranoia stoked by its own media machinery. Now the whole world is begging Uncle Sam to come back to protect them from bearded Arabs carrying guns hiding under their beds, and Uncle Sam is more than happy to oblige.
'Axis of Evil' or 'Axis of Convenience'?
Living as we do at an age when politicians speak like teenagers brought up on a diet of MTV and Diet Coke, we are faced with simple choices in life. One is either with the forces of good or the forces of evil. One is either 'with them' or 'against them'. America's unilateral ways have been given an added boost, as it hops on the crusader bandwagon to go hunting for Islamist militants the world over.
For those countries that face the problem of increasing Islamist activism on its shores, the US's new role as the global policeman and protector of humanity comes as a welcome relief. Witness how practically every government in the Asean region has paid homage to the powers-that-be in Washington, and promised to help the US in its war against terror.
The Philippines has once again become America's biggest aircraft carrier in Asean (Britain having the honour of being the biggest aircraft carrier in Western Europe). Singapore has become the nerve-centre for all sorts of counter-espionage operations. Indonesia has become the open ground for fieldwork on how to study this species of human beings called Muslims. And now Malaysia has stated that it will help the US by making the country the regional hub in the war against terror.
In all these cases, a common meta-narrative is at work: Asean governments cannot do the job themselves, and so they have to invite the help of the Americans to do what Asians should be doing for themselves. We, in turn, are expected to be grateful and co-operative, whatever the long-term political costs might be.
Today, this sort of backhanded diplomacy is called 'bilateral co-operation for mutually beneficial objectives'. In the past it was called Western intervention, pure and simple: a prelude to something much greater that was called imperialism. Before we walk into a pit that we cannot extricate ourselves from, it would be wise to reflect on our own problematic (and often embarrassing) history in case we might learn a lesson or two from it.
No stranger to intervention
Malaysia is not a stranger to Western intervention. The process of intervention that would eventually lead to indirect British colonial rule began with the Pangkor Treaty that was signed on 20th January 1874 between the British colonial authorities and Sultan Abdullah of Perak.
After previous debacles such as the Naning War and the Civil War of Pahang, the British government was loathe to interfere directly in Malay affairs. Sultan Abdullah's invitation for a British advisor to be sent to his court was an indirect way of inviting the British to intervene on his behalf in the succession dispute between himself and the two other contenders to the throne: Sultan Ismail and Raja Yusuf.
In the short term Sultan Abdullah managed to win British support, but it was to end in disaster when he decided to renege on the agreements of the Pangkor Treaty which he discovered to be against his interests. British support was withdrawn, and after the death of the first colonial resident J. W. Birch in 1875, Sultan Abdullah was forced to abdicate his throne.
By inviting British assistance in his kingdom in order to help shore up his own political standing in the land, Sultan Abdullah was acting in accordance with traditional Kerajaan culture where Malay rulers had always turned to allies and external powers to form instrumental alliances in times of crisis.
However, the content of the treaty he was about to sign meant that he had inadvertently opened up the way for the introduction of British laws, norms and mores into his kingdom as well. For the Pangkor Treaty also stipulated that the advice of the British Resident assigned to the Perak court was not to be taken lightly, and indeed the ruler had no choice but to follow the advice of the Resident to the letter, in all matters save those regarding traditional Malay customs and religion.
Model for British-Malay relations
The general administration of the kingdom was also to be regulated under the supervision of the British Resident, as well as the collection of revenues and the control of state finances and expenditure.
Once the Residential system of indirect rule was established in Perak, it quickly became the model for British-Malay relations in the other neighbouring kingdoms. The courts of Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang were all made to receive British Residents, whose advice they could not refuse.
The Perak debacle that led to the Pangkor Treaty provided the British with the cultural backdrop and tapestry against which the whole sordid story was to be told. The British justified their actions on the grounds that the native ruler was in trouble and desperately wanted outside intervention to restore law and order in the land.
Theories of native unrest and native misrule were spun in order to justify what later became a textbook case of indirect colonisation through the most sophisticated of means.
Though contemporary Malaysian historiography invariably paints a picture of the British as the bad guys (which they were), it has to be said that that is only part of the picture. For the truth is that British intervention into Perak's domestic politics would not have been possible had it not been for the short-sighted strategy of Sultan Abdullah himself. As was the case with the Sultan of Brunei who had effectively handed over his entire kingdom to 'Rajah' Brooke so that the latter could 'rule on his behalf', Sultan Abdullah had practically handed over to the British his kingdom on a plate: all for the price of a gilded crown (that was ultimately taken from him anyway).
Today, as the governments of Asean fall over themselves in their mad rush to the White House, we need to ask ourselves the same question: What do we hope to gain from further US intervention in Asean affairs, and what will be ultimate costs be? Who will be the winners and who will be the losers in this game of diplomatic poker?
Misguided discourses
The bottom line is simply this: While it cannot be denied that some extremist movements and elements exist in Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia, it would be incorrect (and politically foolhardy) to assume that every single one of these radical movements is motivated by a pathological hatred of the United States of America.
If America figures so large in their overheated and often misguided discourses, it is simply a reflection of the hegemonic status that the US has as the only remaining superpower in the world. It is also a reflection of the sense of anger, disappointment and frustration with Washington for its continued support of Israel, which remains a thorn in the side of many Arab nationalist movements and which has contributed to the radicalisation of Islamist movements the world over.
But many, if not all, of the radical movements we see in Asean today — such as the Free Aceh movement in Indonesia, the Barisan Mujahideen Patani (BMPP) in Southern Thailand and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines are basically local movements caught up in the vice of local politics.
Even PAS in Malaysia has as its target its nemesis UMNO, and not the US. If these movements chose to graft onto their oppositional rhetoric the discourse of Osama ben Laden and the al-Qaeda, we should not be distracted by this or forget the fact that their complains are directed mainly at their own local governments.
To call on Washington to come and help to resolve these local conflicts is a recipe for disaster, as it merely opens the way for further intervention and interference in domestic affairs. What is more, by presenting these local movements as part of some grand global terrorist conspiracy would in effect create a transnational alliance where there was none. Washington is, in fact, creating a new 'Eastern bloc' to counter its own — though this time the enemy comes dressed in a shade of green instead of red.
Escalation of violence
The net effect in the long run would be the further escalation of violence and the radicalisation of these opposition movements. While they operated in isolation in the past, America's uninvited (and in many cases unwelcome) re-entry into the region has given them a unity of purpose and singularity of mind that they did not previously possess. While Asean had to contend with a motley crew of disparate and hapless desperados in the past, it now has at its doorstep a virtually united front assembled against a common enemy: the 'Great Satan' known as the United States.
This can only lead to further polarisation and intensification of conflict, and in return we can only expect an even greater effort on the part of the US to assert its will and strength by force and whatever means necessary. Who benefits from this in the end? Certainly not the ordinary people of Asean.
The only winner in this race to mutual destruction is the United States itself, which has been handed the opportunity to re-assert its will and presence in the region, and given the dubious honour of picking up the 'white man's burden' of keeping the law in the land of the natives.
Worse of all, America's return to Southeast Asia will also help to polarise the already deeply divided forces of moderate and radical Islam in the region. Long known as a bastion of inter-religious harmony and peaceful co-existence, Southeast Asian Islam has stood apart from the more radical currents of Islam elsewhere in the Muslim world.
But now that Washington wants to have a hand in the running of things in the region — advising here, advising there — it invariably means that moderate, liberal and progressive Muslims will find themselves between a rock and a hard place.
Alternative vision of Islam
While they were free to condemn the excesses of Islamist radicals in the past, any such criticism today will be seen as working against the interests of Islam and in favour of the interests of the Americans. Malaysia and Indonesia's efforts to promote an alternative vision of Islam will suddenly be recast by their radical detractors as a counterfeit 'made-in-Washington' Islam that is toothless, gutless and spineless.
Sponsorship and patronage by Western donor agencies do not and will not help either, as it would merely reinforce the mistaken belief that all such efforts are at the request and direction of Western interests and agencies.
On top of that, the Muslim states in Southeast Asia will face even more difficult times ahead. Already under attack for their so-called 'secular' and 'Western' ways, having the Yankees on your doorstep makes it even more difficult (if not impossible) to deny that you have become the 'White Man's Good Muslim'.
Overnight, the goodwill and credibility that the Malaysian and Indonesian governments have earned over the years may dissipate in a flash. Years of hard work will be poured down the drain, just for the sake of currying favour with the West.
These, then, are some of the costs involved in this, the latest adventure of the US in Southeast Asia. When the British were invited to intervene in the affairs of Perak, little did Sultan Abdullah suspect that they would stay there for more than a hundred years. This time round, Uncle Sam has come with his bags full and ready to stay. Did anyone ask if he brought along a return ticket?
Endnotes:
(1) Initially the practicalities of intervention were ill-conceived and confoundingly vague. Sir Andrew Clarke, the new Governor to the Straits Settlements, was begged to undertake the enterprise by the desperate W. H. Read, but it was in fact the invitation from Sultan Abdullah of Perak (in 1874) for Clarke to send a British 'advisor' to help him manage the affairs of his kingdom that set the wheels of the intervention process in motion. At first even the duties and sphere of authority of the 'advisors' were not clearly identified and specified in any way. Therefore the Pangkor treaty of 1874 did not signify a radical change in British imperial policy simply because there was no clear understanding of what that policy was in the first place.
Dr FARISH A NOOR is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist. ''The Other Malaysia' tries to unearth aspects of Malaysia's history and culture that have been erased or relegated to the margins in order to remind us that there remains another Malaysia that is often forgotten.